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Abstract This paper presents a computational model of consumer behavior.
We consider two sources of product-specific consumer skill acquisition: learn-
ing by consuming and consumer socialization. Consumers utilize these two
sources in order to derive higher valuations for products they consume. In
this framework, we discuss the behavior of returns to advertising relative
to changes in product characteristics, such as quality and user-friendliness.
The main finding is that, in the case of duopoly, dependence of returns to
advertising on product quality is not monotonic as had been suggested by
earlier studies. Rather, returns have an inverted U shape, given the quality
of the competing product.
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1 Introduction
It is the nature of the capitalistic free market that the results of producer
actions are ultimately anchored to consumer behavior. It is consumers who
decide when to buy and what to buy, and how to respond to price or quality
changes in products supplied to them. Thus, we believe that the analysis of any
economic phenomenon should start with the analysis of consumer decisions.
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The process of consumer decision-making is complex. It is affected by
numerous forces, some more important than others. Our everyday decisions
about which products to purchase are largely influenced by our own consump-
tion history, by the information coming from our social network, as well as by
the information received from the media.
At the same time, in today’s world of advanced technologies, many products
need specific consumption skills in order to be utilized to their maximum
capacity. We argue that the level of these skills plays an important role in
consumer decisions about the composition of a significant share of their con-
sumption baskets. Thus, effects of producer decisions are heavily influenced
by the process of skill accumulation by consumers.
This paper looks at the influence of the skill acquisition process on con-
sumers’ decisions. We consider the problem of choosing a product among
multiple alternatives. We discuss two sources of consumer skill acquisition:
learning by consuming and the consumer socialization process. Learning
by consuming means that consumers acquire skills along the consumption
process, while consumer socialization implies that consumers obtain skill
spillovers from their social network.
In this framework, as a new product enters the market, it is met with
some initial skill distribution over the population of consumers. Consumers
who purchase new products will acquire more skills through the consumption
process, and these skills will be further diffused through a socialization process.
Thus, consumer purchasing decisions have temporal effects on average skill
levels over the population. High rates of initial market penetration will ensure
fast acquisition and the diffusion of skills for new products. This implies that a
new product will be able to grab higher market shares during the transition to
equilibrium. This framework is suitable for analyzing the effects of producer
policies that can influence consumer skill levels. We discuss the effects of such
policies using the example of product promotion (advertising).
Advertising is recognized as one of the essential activities of a modern
firm. Economists, as well as business and marketing academicians, have shown
interest in its effects. The main concern has been whether advertising can
be used to create barriers to entry and thus to generate a long-run compar-
ative advantage. Views on this issue are not unified: some researchers find
that advertising can be effectively used for creating barriers to entry (e.g.
Comanor and Wilson 1967, 1979), while others find the opposite (e.g. Erickson
and Jacobson 1992). In this paper, we tackle a similar problem. We use an
innovative framework in which effects of producer actions are rooted in the
micro behavior of consumers. We investigate the manner in which returns to
advertising (measured as the gain in market share) depend on quality and user-
friendliness of the product when consumers make their product purchases,
taking into account their product-specific skills.
Products that we have in mind are those that are relatively durable. They are
repeatedly purchased by households and are technologically sophisticated to
some extent. This description fits well the group of products called “consumer
electronics.” This class of products has one more characteristic that makes
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it particularly interesting for us: the products in this category are widely
advertised. According to AdvertisingAge, in year the 2007 producers of con-
sumer electronics in the USA spent 50% of their profits on advertising.1 This
indicates that producers of consumer electronics rely heavily on advertising as
a way of promoting their products.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing
related literature about learning and socialization among heterogeneous con-
sumers. Section 3 formulates the model of consumer behavior, while Section 4
presents the analysis and results of the model. Section 5 summarizes the paper
and provides some concluding remarks.
2 Individual learning and socialization by consumers
An important characteristic of the model analyzed in this paper is that
consumer behavior evolves through individual learning. Consumers learn
individually through experience as well as from social interactions. Individual
learning implies heterogeneity among agents, as skill levels might differ across
consumers. Models with heterogenous agents are quickly gaining recognition
within the discipline. They present an alternative to models characterized
by a representative agent. In the late 1980s, criticism of a representative
agent emerged concerning its ability to describe correctly the behavior of
an economy populated by heterogeneous agents (Kirman 1992). The model
presented in this paper does not have a representative agent. In fact, it can be
shown that the representative agent cannot be constructed for the economy
discussed here.
Similar to agent heterogeneity, individual learning is not new to economics.
It has been extensively discussed in the literature. Learning takes many
different forms. Detailed discussion of them is outside the scope of the current
paper paper; a comprehensive survey can be found in Brenner (1999, 2006).
One of the most widespread forms of individual learning is learning-by-doing.
It has been widely used in economics to explain the effects of innovation and
technical change (e.g. Arrow 1962). The idea is that one becomes better at
doing something by simply doing it. We have a similar concept in our paper
applied to consumer learning: consumers become better at utilizing products
that they frequently use. The path of skill level of an individual is called a
learning curve (Ebbinghaus 1964). Learning curves have mostly been used in
economics to study the rate of producer cost reduction along with increasing
experience (Spence 1981; Cabral and Riordan 1997). In this paper, we use the
learning curve idea to describe consumer learning.
Apart from learning-by-consuming, agents can acquire consumption skills
in other ways. For example, they can help each other out and share the
1Source: 2007 advertising to sales ratios for 200 largest advertising spending industries, www.
adage.com.
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skills that they have accumulated. This calls for (non-market) interactions
among agents. Modeling non-market interactions among economic agents has
a long tradition, but it has become increasingly important in the last two
decades. There are various models analyzing interactions among consumers
(e.g. Eshel et al. 1996; Cowan et al. 1997). In general, interactions generate
feedback loops that affect the decisions of the economic agents. As noted
by Gleaser and Scheinkman (2000), the structure of these interactions does
matter for the outcome we obtain. In particular, they show that, in the case of
local interactions, systems generate more interesting dynamics, have multiple
equilibria, and demonstrate the possibility of moving from one equilibrium
to another. More contextualized works show that interaction can explain
certain interesting phenomena in economics and other social sciences, such
as standardization processes (e.g. Arthur 1989; Cowan 1991; Eshel et al. 1998),
waves in consumption across the population classes (Cowan et al. 2004), and
contagious justice (Alexander and Skyrms 1999).
Non-market interaction among consumers is usually modeled as a socializa-
tion process. Consumer socialization has been identified as being important
for various social processes, first in sociology (e.g. Roszak 1969) and then in
the business literature (e.g. Moschis and Churchill 1978). Sociologists have
been concerned with consumer skill acquisition by adolescents through in-
teraction with peers as well as parents, but aspects of life-long learning have
been also discussed (Ward 1974). Marketing academicians have also studied
consumption skill acquisition of young people, as the learning process is more
pronounced in this age-group (Moschis and Churchill 1978). Although some
aspects of consumer socialization processes have been discussed in economics,
to the best of our knowledge, consumer skill sharing through social processes
has not been studied. This paper contributes to filling this gap.
In our paper, we combine learning by consuming with learning through
socialization and discuss consumer skill upgrading along the learning curve.
The idea of skill acquisition through consumption has been introduced to eco-
nomics by Witt (2001) under the notion of “learning to consume.” The author
makes a distinction between the two aspects of learning through consumption:
cognitive and non-cognitive. Witt (2001) discusses the subject through the lens
of changing preferences and argues that both types of learning (cognitive, as
well as non-cognitive) change the consumer preferences and, as a result, the
future pattern of consumption of an individual. In this paper, we formalize a
part of Witt’s learning to consume ideas. In line with Witt (2001), we claim
that consuming certain products gives incentives to consume these products
again. The mathematical modeling of learning forces in this paper takes quite
a general form which can accommodate cognitive (purposeful) learning, as
well as non-cognitive learning, which, in our context, might be an accidental
discovery of new (unknown to a consumer) features of a product in the process
of consumption. The latter part is profoundly different from the definition
of non-cognitive learning by Witt (2001), who looks at the matter from the
angle of associative learning. There are additional distinctions between forces
modeled in this paper and forces considered by Witt (2001). Here we only
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discuss learning in a single product context, rather than learning to consume in
general, which is equivalent to forming a habit of consuming. We concentrate
on consumers acquiring skills to utilize better separate products. To emphasize
these similarities and distinctions, the learning process discussed in this paper
is named “learning how to consume.”
In the next section, we present a model that uses heterogeneous agents
(Kirman 1992), that interact locally outside the market (Cowan et al. 1997).
Consumer skills that are acquired through consumption (Witt 2001) are
diffused among agents through social interactions (Ward 1974). In this en-
vironment, results of any action by producers are anchored to consumer
behavior through their effects on individual skill levels. There are temporal
feedbacks present in the scheme which determine the size of any effect. We
use this model to study the returns on advertising (Mariel and Orbe 2005) and
its impact on the market shares of advertisers.
3 The model of consumer behavior
Consider an economy with many heterogeneous agents, who have to choose
one product every period from an available product set. Each consumer (s)
has an idiosyncratic valuation (v) for every product (n) at every time period
(t). Valuation of a product for a consumer is the maximum price this consumer
is willing to pay.
On the supply side, assume there are many (substitute) products with
different qualities (λ) offered on the market. We assume that λ can be
measured in monetary units. We abstract from the differences in prices as well
as from the possibility of their temporal change and fix the prices of all the
products to be equal to a constant over time.
Consumers are myopic: they make decisions by maximizing one-shot utility.
Although we are aware of the shortcomings of the concept of utility maximiza-
tion, we still use it in this work due to its advantages for the tractability of the
formal model. We follow the standard discrete choice literature and model
consumer choices probabilistically (Anderson et al. 1992). The probability
that consumer s will choose product n at time t is a function of the vector of
valuations (Vst ) that a given consumer holds for a given time period.
Assume that the valuation is multiplicative in two parts: one is the quality
of the product (λ), the other is the consumer skill level (k ∈ [0, 1]), which we
assume to be product-specific. If the level of consumer skill is 1, she can utilize
the given product to its maximum capacity, thus her valuation of the product
will be equal to the product quality.
Skill levels change over time: consumers learn through consumption and
socialization. In modeling individual learning we follow the literature about
learning curves pioneered by Ebbinghaus (1964). We assume that learning by
consuming occurs at a decreasing rate and specify the learning function as:






where δ is the speed of learning, ks0 is the initial skill level of agent s for the
product under discussion, and m is the number of times a product has been
consumed prior to (and including) the current one.
From Eq. 1, we can derive the change in skill levels between two subsequent
consumptions of the same product





where γ = 1 − e−δ .
Using Eq. 2, one can write the law of motion for the valuations of a product
while abstracting from the consumer skill sharing process. Recall that vst = kstλ,
thus multiplying both sides of the Eq. 2 by λ will yield:





Every time period t agent s chooses product n for purchase with the
probability psn;t(V
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where Et(x) denotes the expectation about the value of variable x at time t.
An important point to note in Eq. 4 is that, besides the product-specific
quality level, expected dynamics of valuations also depends on the product
specific speed of learning (γn). This parameter can be interpreted as user-
friendliness. If γn is high, the skill acquisition for the product is fast, while
in case of a low γn it takes a lot of time before the skill level of a consumer
converges to its maximum.
Regarding the socialization process, consider each consumer interacting
with a small and constant group of other consumers. We assume that through
this interaction some of them can acquire product specific consumer skills. For
the sake of tractability, assume that consumers are aligned on a unidimensional
lattice (circle) and that each interacts with only two neighbors (one on each
side). The consumer can learn about (upgrade skills for) a product through
socialization if, and only if, there is at least one consumer in the neighborhood
with higher consumer skills for this particular product. We assume that there is
a constant rate of learning (μ) through socialization. We restrict consumers to
be able to learn about any product from only one neighbor in any single time
period and assume that they are choosing the most skillful consumers in their
social networks as their mentors. The rationale for this is that there is a cost
of communication and the rate of learning is constant. Thus, maximization of
utility implies that one would choose the most skillful neighbor from whom
to learn. Ignoring learning through consuming for a moment, the effect of
consumer socialization on valuation can be written as








It is important to note that μ is neither product nor consumer specific.
In principle, μ could well be consumer specific, which would reflect the
differences in the absorptive capacity of consumers. However, that would
further increase the already large parameter space of the model. Instead,
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one can think of μ as the interaction intensity, which can be thought of as a
characteristic of the society.
To combine two forces of consumer learning, we assume that, in spite of the
product choices, socialization affects the valuations of all the products in every
time period. This means that consumers acquire some skills for every product
at every time period (given that they have not reached the highest skill level
and they are not the most highly skilled consumers in their neighborhood).
Multiplying both sides of Eq. 5 by λn and combining it with the Eq. 4 gives the
















It is important to note that the expected law of motion of product valuations
is product-specific, as well as consumer-specific. Thus, we have N × S of
these equations (where N is the number of products, and S is the number of
consumers in the economy). It is impossible to obtain an analytic solution for
this system for any reasonable shape of the probability function. Due to this
complication, we use numerical simulations to address the research questions.
4 Returns to product promotion
The model specified in Section 3 describes the dynamics of purchasing prob-
abilities of every product for every consumer in the economy. This property
seems to be particularly appealing for studying market share dynamics of
products on markets with fixed sizes. An important aspect of competing for
market shares is product promotion. Producers can promote their product
and affect the purchase probabilities of consumers. One widespread tool for
product promotion is advertising.
The ground for theoretical work on advertising was laid by Nelson
(1974a, b). He considered advertising as a signal of product quality and
speculated about the effects of advertising and its differences across types of
products. He split the product space in two: “experience goods,” the character-
istics of which can only be learned through experience, and “search goods,” the
characteristics of which are observable prior to purchase. Nelson claimed that
advertising would have a higher impact on “experience goods,” thus expected
experience goods to be advertised more. Some time later, Nelson’s speculative
ideas were formalized by Milgrom and Roberts (1986). They discussed only
experience goods and concentrated on the impact of advertising across product
quality. Milgrom and Roberts found that high quality brands would have
higher incentive to advertise than low quality brands. Empirical support for
this finding was provided by Nichols (1998) for the automobile industry. It
is evident that academicians have mostly regarded advertising as a tool for
signaling the product’s high quality, thus the intuitive finding that producers
of products with higher quality should have higher incentive to advertise. The
following theoretical work (e.g. Landes and Rosenfield 1994) has been built on
this intuition.
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Unlike product quality, virtually no work has been done to analyze the
effects of variance in product user-friendliness on returns to product promo-
tion. However, one can hypothesize that products that are less user-friendly
should benefit more from advertising because they require more extensive use
by consumers to acquire an adequate share of their consumption baskets.
In this section, we analyze the effects of parameter changes (product quality
and user-friendliness) on returns to product promotion implied by the model
of consumer behavior presented in Section 3.2 We test the two intuitions
specified above (about the effects of product quality and user-friendliness) in
environments where consumers are learning how to consume.
In order to discuss the returns to product promotion, we have to introduce
a couple of notions and specify the ways in which we measure important
variables. We do this in the following section.
4.1 Measurement
Measuring a market share As we are studying markets with constant sizes, we
can, without a loss of generality, normalize their size to unity. Then, the market





Following the discrete choice literature (Anderson et al. 1992), we assume
that the probability of product n to be chosen by agent s at time t is described









Thus, ultimately market share dynamics depend on the dynamics of val-







Equation 9 implies that h¯n ∝ eλn , which effectively means that products with
higher quality are guaranteed higher equilibrium market shares.3 Equilibrium
market share distribution does not depend on any other parameter of the
2Although in some places throughout the paper we refer to this phenomena as advertising, the
modeling takes a general form so the intuitions can be applied to any other type of product
promotion.
3A model with similar outcome has been analyzed by Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), while
Schmalensee (1978) has presented a model in which products with lower qualities can have higher
equilibrium market shares.
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model. The rest of the parameters influence only the transition path to the
time invariant distribution.
Measuring returns to product promotion As argued in Section 2, in this model
the effects of product promotion are anchored to skill acquisition. If the
average consumer skill level in the population has not reached its maximum
for product n, advertising will influence not only the probability of its purchase
at the time period when it is advertised, but also during subsequent periods.
Higher purchase probability today ensures higher rate of skill acquisition,
which in turn influences the purchase probability for the next period. Thus,
as long as advertising is undertaken before the average skill level reaches
unity, it has a long-lasting effect (Landes and Rosenfield 1994) and influences
transitional dynamics to the time invariant market share distribution. On the
other hand, if advertising takes place after everybody has learned how to utilize
the product to its maximum capacity, it will not have any effect on purchasing
probability in subsequent periods.
At this point, we have to recognize that there are many ways to advertise
a product, by which we mean that there are many strategies for spending the
budget allocated to product promotion. Recent literature puts the emphasis
on the search for the optimal temporal advertising policies. It has been found
that pulsation advertising policies4 are more efficient than uniform advertising
policies5 on a wide range of markets (Vande Kamp and Kaiser 2000). Mesak
and Zhang (2001) provide the theoretical support for this finding on monopo-
listic markets. In general, however, the search for the optimal temporal policy
has not yet yielded any clear recommendation for businesses.
Due to the lack of the theoretical work on the subject, we are confronted
with the choice of advertising strategy in order to undertake the investigation
into returns to product promotion. Thus, we consider the choice to be whether
to advertise or not, rather than how much to advertise, or how to advertise.
We assume that, for some fixed cost, which is constant across producers, the
producer of product n can influence every consumer’s purchase probability
in the following manner: if, without advertising, consumer s would buy the








where A is the effect of advertising, which is constant.
It takes simple algebra to notice that pˆsn;0 > p
s
n;0 as long as A > 0, which we
assume is the case. To see the further effects of this mechanism, notice that
the probability of purchase positively depends on the valuation of the product
(Eq. 10), which is proportional to the skill for the product (as vst = kstλ). The
4Spending large chunks of money at discrete periods of time.
5Distributing the advertising budget uniformly over an extended period.
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upgrade of those skills positively depends on the purchase probability (Eq. 4).
Thus, an exogenous increase in one of these variables creates a feedback
loop which increases all the other variables (and ultimately increases itself)
in subsequent periods. This is the mechanism by which consumers respond to
actions by producers in our framework.
From pˆsn;0 > p
s
n;0 we can deduce that hˆn;0 > hn;0. Following the temporal









n;t−1 < 1 ⇒ hˆn;t > hn;t. So, adver-
tising results in a market share gain over an extended period of time if the
producer advertises during the first period when her product was put on the








where rn is the return on advertising for product n.
4.2 Analysis
By looking at the structure of our model, we can derive certain expectations
about the effects of model parameters on returns to product promotion in
environments where consumers are learning how to consume. The effect of
advertising on market share distribution depends on parameter γ —the user-
friendliness of a product. If γ is high, the probability gain of a certain size will
result in higher average skill level and thus in (on average) higher valuation of
the product during the next period compared to when γ is low. But at the same
time, a higher γ would also directly imply higher skills as well as valuation of
the product in the next period compared, to a lower γ . Thus, the size of market
share gain due to advertising in case of a lower or higher γ is not clear right
away.
Returns to advertising also depend on product quality (λ). The higher the
quality, the more time it takes to reach the equilibrium market share for a
given initial valuation and γ . Therefore, there is potential for higher return
on advertising. But at the same time, consider the situation in which only two
products are competing on the market. Assume that their qualities and user-
friendliness levels are the same. Then without advertising, both products will
have half of the market share (if we also assume they start from equal average
initial valuations). In this case, advertising of one of the products will result in
market share gain, which is the measure of return to advertising. Now assume
one of the products is of a much higher quality, ceteris paribus. Consider the
case in which the difference between λs is so high that the equilibrium share
of the better product is 95%. Will this better product have a higher return
6The only case in which this statement is not true is when ∀s vsn;0 = λn, which we rule out as it does
not involve any learning, and thus is not interesting.
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to advertising? It is not clear, as the product would quickly acquire its market
share even without advertising, so returns to advertising for this scenario would
be marginal.
As a result, we can hypothesize that neither product quality nor the level
of user-friendliness has a monotonic effect on returns to advertising in our
model. We use the r measure to analyze the effects of changes in values of
these parameters on returns to product promotion.
There are few possible competition environments in which one can analyze
these factors. A market in which there is only one active product (i.e. a product
that can increase its market share by advertising for an extended period) is
the most simple one.7 With one active product on the market, returns to
advertising completely depend on the product’s own characteristics and the
model yields somewhat trivial results: lower product quality and higher user-
friendliness result in higher returns to product promotion.
Notice that the effect of the product quality is at odds with intuitions in the
earlier literature. The reason is that, in this case competition is not present:
although there are incumbent products on the market, they are inactive. To
understand why this environment should result in higher returns for lower
quality products, consider two products: one of a high quality, the other of
a low quality. When they are put on the same market, advertising in both
cases will result in an equal size jump in their market shares. After this jump,
market share dynamics start converging to the original (without advertising)
transition path towards the equilibrium. Due to the model specification, the
convergence speed will be higher for the high quality product. This means that
the lower quality product will stay off the original transitional path longer,
which in principle is the source of returns to advertising.
The intuition behind the result with user-friendliness is simpler: the higher
the user-friendliness of a product, the easier the skills are to acquire. There-
fore, the equilibrium market share will be reached faster. Because returns to
product promotion are measured as the difference between the two scenarios
(with advertising and without advertising), reaching equilibrium faster guaran-
tees higher returns.
Including more new products brings new insights, as returns now depend
not only on a product’s own characteristics, but also on competitors’ charac-
teristics. At the same time, they increase the burden of managing the model,
as the introduction of every additional competitor increases the number of
parameters. As a result, rigorous analysis of markets with many competitors
becomes impossible in this framework. Thus we choose to analyze in greater
detail the market with only two new products in order to detect intimate links
between the parameter changes and returns to product promotion.
7Recall that, if the product is on the market long enough for the average consumer skill to be
sufficiently close to 1, the producer has no incentive to do costly advertising and it becomes
inactive. Thus, this case simply means that there is only one new product on the market. This
is equivalent to monopolistic competition, which we can not discuss in its classical form as returns
to advertising are measured as the gain in market share.
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To demonstrate the results, it is convenient to assume that the number of
incumbents on the market is zero, meaning that there are no other rivals to
the two new entrants that are engaged in competition for market share. As a
consequence, we discuss the case of duopoly.
Consider a new industry arising, having two firms that enter simultaneously.
The two firms produce substitute products, but their characteristics (λ and γ )
might differ. One of the problems in discussing the effects of advertising in
this setup is that both firms can advertise simultaneously. Therefore, if we
choose one of the firms and discuss returns to its advertising, we will have
virtually two regimes to analyze: one when the competitor does not advertise
and the other when the competitor does advertise. These two regimes might
produce not only quantitatively but also qualitatively different responses to
advertising. Yet, numerous simulations show that this is not the case in our
model: although these two regimes produce quantitatively different results, the
qualitative behavior of returns is similar across those regimes, meaning that,
if one plots the size of returns against model parameters, the profile has the
same shape no matter whether the competitor advertises or not. Their profiles
might differ quantitatively, but these differences are extremely small, often
negligible.
The reason for this is the following. Consider these two products having the
same characteristics (λ and γ ). In this case, if none of the producers advertise,
both of the products will have half of the market share from start to end.8 If
one of the producers advertises, she takes additional market share from the
competitor in that period. As a result, skills for that product accumulate faster
and this will give temporal advantage to the advertiser’s product. This will
last for some period until the average skill levels converge to one and market
shares of both competitors converge to 50%.
Now consider what happens if the other producer also advertises. Of
course, both of them stay with 50% market share; thus we get the same
dynamics of market shares as when neither of the producers was advertising.
In this situation, gains from advertising when the competitor advertises and
when the competitor does not advertise (in terms of market share gain due
to advertising) are exactly equal. The situation becomes asymmetric when
characteristics of the products start to differ from each other. However, as long
as the differences between the product characteristics are not extremely large,
returns to product promotion when the competitor advertises and when she
does not are sufficiently close. Thus, in the rest of this section the discussion of
one of the scenarios will suffice. Due to simulation simplicity, we choose the
scenario when the competitor does not advertise.
If we have two active products on the market, we have pairs of λs and
γ s to work with. But as these products are competing only with each other,
intuitively important parameters would be the ratio of λs and the ratio of γ s
rather than the values of single parameters themselves. Thus, we work with
8Here we assuming that the averages of initial skill levels for both products are equal.
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these ratios. This complicates the reporting of results. To solve this problem,
we work with peculiar scales for the presentation of simulation outcomes. The
axes for the parameter ratios are constructed in such a way that they reach
one in the center, which means that the two parameters under discussion have
equal values. This splits the axes in two. The right half is a linear scale and
reaches some maximum value (e.g. 5, which would mean that the value of the
parameter is five times that of the value of the corresponding parameter of the
competitor’s product), while the left half symmetrically follows the right half
and takes values of one over the corresponding value from the right half (thus
in this case the left half of the axes would go to 1/5, which would mean that
the value of the parameter is five times lower compared to the corresponding
parameter of the competitor). To eliminate the differences in results due to the
differences in absolute values of the parameter, parameter ratios are created
by holding the average of the parameter values constant across the axes. This
means that if the ratio of xs being equal to one is created by x1 = 2 and x2 = 2,
then the ratio of 3 is created by x1 = 3 and x2 = 1 and the ratio of 1/3 is created
by x1 = 1 and x2 = 3.
The left panel of Fig. 1 reports returns to advertising for the different values
of the ratios of product user-friendliness (gamma) and quality (lambda). In
these simulations, we fix the number of consumers to be 100 and the intensity
of communication to be μ = 0.3. The range of axes are chosen so that the
picture presented displays the relevant portion of the profile. Moving closer
towards zero or infinity results in an absolutely flat profile. These are the
averages of 40 runs, standard deviations are very small. Every run covers the
whole spectrum of γ and λ ratios. In the beginning of every run, we generate
consumers and the initial skill distribution for each of the products, averages of
which are equal. After that, we run the economy as long as it takes advertising



























Fig. 1 The case of duopoly: dependence of returns to advertising on quality and user-friendliness
(left) and on user-friendliness and communication intensity (right). Lighter shades of gray indicate
higher values
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by generating the new skill level distributions. Of course, the averages of every
run’s skill distributions are equal.
There are a couple of observations one can make about the left panel of
Fig. 1. The first is that, no matter what the user-friendliness of the product is,
if the quality of the product is sufficiently higher or lower than the quality
of the competitor, then returns to advertising are low as compared to the
situation when qualities are equal.9 The reason for this is that, in both cases,
advertising can not affect the skill level development in the economy: if
the product is doomed for 0.5% of the market share, there is little product
promotion can do to affect the transitional dynamics to the equilibrium. The
same reasoning applies to the symmetric situation: if the equilibrium market
share of a product is 99.5%, the product cannot gain much more by advertising
during the transition.
The second observation is that, if product qualities are sufficiently close
to each other, the dependence of returns to product promotion on user-
friendliness of the product has a double-humped shape: starting from the
relatively non-user-friendly product, as user-friendliness increases, initially
so do returns to advertising, but they fall after some time, reaching a local
minimum when user-friendliness parameters of the two products are equal,
then they rise and fall again.
The explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the dual nature
of the advertising in our model: besides the fact that advertising ensures
more early consumers for the product, it also ensures fewer consumers, and
slower skill accumulation, for the competitor. Thus, given the equal product
qualities, if the product is more user-friendly (relative to the competitor), the
major contribution to the returns comes from more consumers consuming
this product, while the contribution due to fewer consumers consuming the
competitor’s product is minor. On the other hand, if the product is (relatively)
less user-friendly, the contribution from deterring some consumers from con-
suming the competitor’s user-friendly product becomes much larger, while
the contribution from increased consumption of the own product is minor.
The dependence of both of these effects on the level of user-friendliness is
non-linear. It seems that their joint effect is smaller when the levels of user-
friendliness are equal to each other, than when they are (not too) different.
This explains the double peaked nature of the returns/gamma profile.
Recall that, in the simulations reported in the left panel of Fig. 1, we fixed
the communication intensity, μ. It is important to perform a robustness check
to see whether the double-humped shape is due to some peculiar value of
communication intensity or whether it persists for the different values of this
parameter. In the right panel of Fig. 1, we present the results from similar
simulations. In this case, we fix product qualities and vary communication
intensity instead. As we saw from the left panel, interesting dynamics are in
9Although here we report results for one particular μ, the shape of the profile is virtually the same
for other values of communication intensity.
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place when competitors’ products have quality levels which are sufficiently
close to each other. So, in this simulation, we fix the ratio of qualities to be
one, we vary γ s in the same way as in previous simulations and explore the
whole space of the values of parameter μ. Everything else stays the same as
in the simulations reported in the left panel of Fig. 1. The right panel of Fig. 1
shows that a double-hump shape of returns-user-friendliness profile is present
as long as communication levels are away from extremes. This suggests that
the qualitative behavior (the shape) of r − γ profile is fairly robust to changes
in consumer communication intensity.
4.3 Discussion
In the previous section, we found that the dependence of returns to advertising
on product quality and the level of user-friendliness is not monotonic. This
contradicts previous theoretical (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts 1986), as well as
empirical (e.g. Nichols 1998) contributions to the analysis of the effects of
advertising, which claim that a higher quality would result in higher returns.
Does this mean that the current model contradicts the empirical findings? This
is an important concern which would imply that our base assumptions about
the behavior of consumers are not correct.
To test this, we have to go deeper into the differences between markets used
for empirical studies and the markets we analyzed. The monotonic relationship
between quality and returns has been empirically found on markets with many
diverse producers (e.g. automobiles in the case of Nichols 1998), while we
have discussed the case of duopoly. So, if we want to produce comparable
results, we have to assume that there are many active products on the market
and that all of them have different characteristics. As we argued before,
there is no comprehensive way of thoroughly studying the multi-product cases
using the current model. If one allows more products on the market, each
of them brings two additional parameters. This increases the burden of the
model management. In addition, every extra product increases the discrepancy
between the results when competitors do not advertise and when they do
advertise. If one wants to allow for some of the competitors to advertise while
others do not, it would be better to study a model where products have three
characteristics instead of two. Introducing a new characteristic for products in
this framework will result in a complete reformulation of the model specified in
Section 3. A new model will be substantially less parsimonious than the model
we are considering in the current paper. Therefore, we choose not to explore
this alternative formulation here and keep to the baseline model in order to
derive comparable results to Nichols (1998).
To derive the relevant results, we perform the following exercise. Consider
the case when there are 20 firms on the market. Assume that their qualities
and user-friendliness levels are distributed normally around some means. First,
we generate these distributions along with the distribution of the skill levels
for each product. Then the algorithm picks every combination of λ and γ to






















Fig. 2 The case of competitive market: dependence of returns to advertising on quality and user-
friendliness when the competitors do not advertise (left) and when they do advertise (right)
scenario. For each of the scenarios, the remaining product qualities are coupled
randomly and they comprise the competitor products. As we have 20 λs and
20 γ s, we have 20 × 20 = 400 scenarios. All these 400 scenarios are run for the
fixed distribution of λs and γ s as well as for the fixed distribution of the initial
skilled levels. Then we draw another 20 γ s and 20 λs from the same normal
distribution and another 20 skill distributions over consumers and run all 400
scenarios again. We repeat this exercise 40 times and report averages of returns
to advertising.
When we have many firms, the quantitative difference between the two
scenarios—one when competitors advertise and the other when they do not—
becomes more pronounced. Thus, for this (multi-product) case, we report
both situations. The left panel of Fig. 2 reports turns to advertising when
the remaining 19 producers do not advertise, while the right one reports the
results for the case when all the remaining 19 producers advertise. The axes
on which we measure product characteristics, represent mere ordering in the
relevant distribution, from the minimum to the maximum value of a given
characteristic.
Figure 2, shows that on markets with multiple active products, higher quality
results in higher returns to advertising, no matter the level of user-friendliness.
Thus, our model does not contradict the empirical findings. Rather, it high-
lights the importance of the market structure and warns that the relation
between product quality and returns to advertising might be more complex
than what has been believed before.
5 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed two sources of consumer skill acquisition:
learning by consuming and consumer socialization. We have analyzed a
population of myopic consumers who socialize locally and utilize the above
mentioned two forces to learn how to consume different products.
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In our model, each product on the market has two characteristics: quality
and user-friendliness. Quality is the highest valuation consumers can extract
from a given good; although it can vary over the product space, it does not vary
from consumer to consumer. The long-term market share distribution depends
solely on this characteristic. User-friendliness controls the speed of consumer
skill acquisition through learning by consuming. This, too, is a product specific
characteristic and does not vary from consumer to consumer for a given
product. It does not affect the equilibrium market share distribution, but it
does affect the speed of transitional dynamics towards it.
The society is characterized by one parameter—communication intensity—
which controls the speed of consumer skill diffusion through the socializa-
tion process. Another characteristic of the society is the size of the popu-
lation, which has not been analyzed in this paper due to its straightforward
effects. Larger population size creates greater challenge for the consumer skill
diffusion as the socialization process is local.
In this framework, we have discussed the dependence of returns to product
promotion on product characteristics. We have analyzed two prior beliefes.
One that products with higher quality have higher returns to advertising.
The other, that products that are less user-friendly will also have higher
returns to product promotion. The major conclusion is that, irrespective of the
level of product’s user-friendliness, returns to advertising are higher when a
product competes with another product of a similar quality. If the competitor
is of a considerably higher or lower quality, returns to advertising fall. This
contradicts earlier works (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Nichols 1998) which
claim that the relation between quality and returns is monotonic. We have
shown that this model results in a similar pattern when there are many active
products on the market. Therefore, we can conclude that earlier empirical
findings (Nichols 1998) do not contradict the results of the model presented in
this paper. The fact that the current model results in different r − λ profiles for
different number of active products on the market suggests that dependence
of returns to advertising on product quality is influenced by the market
structure, a variable that has been omitted from previous analysis. This is in
line with Becker and Murphy (1993), who warn that certain effects of product
promotion might depend on the market composition.
Another finding of this paper is that the dependence of returns to ad-
vertising on the level of user-friendliness has a double-peaked shape when
products have similar qualities. This is due to the dual effect of advertising,
which means that advertising benefits producers not only by increasing the
number of consumers using their products but also by reducing the number of
consumers using competitors’ products. The sizes of these two effects change
at different rates across the change of the levels of user-friendliness. In the case
of a product being more user-friendly than that of a competitor, the first effect
dominates, while in the opposite case the second effect is the dominant one.
What is important here is that the sum of these two effects is higher in each
of the cases (when the product is more or less user-friendly compared to the
competitor) than when the competitor’s product is just as user-friendly.
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